University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1994 | Issue 1

Article 24

Determining the Proper Nexus for Vehicle
Forfeiture under 21 USC 881(a)(4)
Wayne W. Yu
Wayne.Yu@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Yu, Wayne W. () "Determining the Proper Nexus for Vehicle Forfeiture under 21 USC 881(a)(4)," University of Chicago Legal Forum:
Vol. 1994: Iss. 1, Article 24.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1994/iss1/24

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Determining the Proper Nexus for Vehicle
Forfeiture Under 21 USC § 881(a)(4)
Wayne W. Yut

In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act 1 (the "Act") to help combat the growing problem of drug abuse in this country.2 Section 881(a)(4) of
the Act 3 permits the government to institute an in rem 4 civil

proceeding against vehicles used in the illegal drug trade. This
provision has developed into a powerful tool in effecting drug
policy.5 The scope of vehicle forfeiture determines the statute's
effectiveness-the wider the scope of forfeiture, the greater its
deterrent effect and the greater the possibility of depleting the
financial reserves of drug traffickers.' In addition to its punitive

t A.B. 1992, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Chicago.
21 USC §§ 801-970 (1988).
2 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, HR Rep No
91-1444, 91st Cong, 2d Sess (1970), reprinted in 1970 USCCAN 4566, 4567.
' Section 881(a) provides in pertinent part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them: .. .(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner
to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9) ....
21 USC § 881(a) (1988). Paragraphs (1), (2), and (9) describe all controlled substances and
all raw materials, products, and equipment linked with the manufacture, processing, and
transport of controlled substances. Id.
' An in rem action is an action against the property itself, as opposed to an action
against the owner of the property. The theory is that the property itself has committed
the wrong, and the guilt or innocence of the owner is irrelevant. See United States v United States Coin & Currency, 401 US 715, 719-20 (1971); United States v Nichols, 841 F2d
1485, 1486 (10th Cir 1988) (stating that "because the property is considered tainted upon
the commission of the wrongful act, the interest of the government vests at the time of
the act").
' See Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 US 663, 686-87 (1974) ("Forfeiture of conveyances that have been used-and may be used again-in violation of the
narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by
preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty,
thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."); United States v One 1977 Cadillac
Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d 500, 502 (5th Cir 1981) ("Forfeiture provisions are an essential
part of the law enforcement effort in the area of illegal drugs.").
' See United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548.F2d 421, 424 (2d Cir
1977) ("Eldorado Sedan") (observing that Congress intended the statute to reduce the
profits of "those who thrive upon the misery of drug addicts"). See also note 5 and accom-
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and deterrent effects, forfeiture generates substantial revenue for
the government because the government obtains title to the forfeited property and subsequently auctions the property.7
Not every use of a vehicle in a drug transaction triggers forfeiture.' Nor does every drug dealer's vehicle become subject to
forfeiture.' Indeed, on its face, Section 881(a)(4) establishes a per
se forfeiture rule only for vehicles that are actually used to transport items of contraband. 10 However, because Section 881(a)(4)
allows for forfeiture of conveyances used "in any manner to facilitate" the sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of illegal drugs,
a vehicle may be subject to forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4)
even where direct transport of contraband is not involved."
Courts disagree as to the proper nexus for vehicle forfeiture
under Section 881(a)(4). Some courts have held that a "substan-

tial connection" to the illegal activity is required, 2 while others
have explicitly rejected this standard and stated that the vehicle
13

need only be connected "in any manner" to the illegal activity,
a broader, literal reading of the statute. Moreover, the courts
purporting to adhere to the substantial connection standard disagree on the definition of "substantial connection,"14 and the

panying text.
' See 21 USC § 881(e) (1988). In 1990, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") seized
5,674 vehicles worth over $60 million, 187 vessels worth over $16 million, and fifty-one
airplanes worth over $25 million. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime and the Justice System 156 (Dec 1992).
8 See United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d 1026, 1028-29 (1st Cir
1980).
' See United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 653 (7th Cir 1993) ("Toyota
4Runner") (stating that "this is not to say that the statute requires the automatic forfeiture of every drug dealer's car").
1" "All conveyances ... which are used ... to transport" controlled substances or
materials used in manufacturing or producing controlled substances are subject to forfeiture. 21 USC § 881(a)(4) (1988). See also One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1028-29.
" "All conveyances ...which are used, or are intended for use ... in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment" of illegal narcotics
are subject to forfeiture. 21 USC § 881(a)(4) (emphasis added).
12 See One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029. See also United States v 1966
Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d 947, 953 (4th Cir 1985); United States v
One 1976 Ford F.150 Pick-Up, 769 F2d 525, 527 (8th Cir 1985). Accord United States v
Schifferli, 895 F2d 987, 989 (4th Cir 1990) (endorsing the substantial connection standard
for Section 881(a)(7) forfeitures); United States v One 1986 Nissan Maxima GL, 895 F2d
1063, 1064 (5th Cir 1990) (endorsing the substantial connection standard for Section
881(a)(6) forfeitures).
"3 See United States v One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir 1983);
United States v 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F2d 725, 727 (5th Cir 1982) (per curiam).
. For example, contrast One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F2d at 527 with 1966
Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d at 953.
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courts applying the "in any manner" test are uncertain as to the
limitations of that test. 5 These disagreements have resulted in
uncertainty as to whether vehicles indirectly linked to a drug
transaction, such as those used solely to transport parties to the
scene of the transaction or negotiation, are properly subject to
forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4).
This Comment examines the proper scope of forfeiture under
Section 881(a)(4). The Comment argues that "facilitation" under
Section 881(a)(4) should be interpreted in light of intent: in cases
of indirect facilitation, the intent of the vehicle's operator should
be determinative. An intent-focused interpretation of Section
881(a)(4) accords with the literal language of the statute16 and
effectuates Congress's intent to crack down on drug dealers,
while simultaneously safeguarding the rights of the accused.
Furthermore, an intent-focused standard for forfeiture properly
reflects the quasi-criminal nature of the statute 7 by explicitly
recognizing intent as a determinative factor, just as the courts
focus on intent in criminal cases.
Part I of this Comment describes the evolution and application of the different approaches to Section 881(a)(4). Part II analyzes the principles and limitations of current approaches to the
statute. Part III proposes an intent-focused standard for defining
the scope of Section 881(a)(4).
I. APPROACHES TO SECTION 881(A)(4)
A.

Before the Act: 49 USC §§ 781-82

Before passage of the Act, the main civil forfeiture provisions
with respect to drug cases were 49 USC §§ 781-82, which were
substantially similar to Section 881(a)(4). 5 Sections 781 and

,"See, for example, Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 652-54. According to Judge Cudahy,
"[ilt
has become increasingly difficult to impose any principled constraints on the exercise
of forfeiture powers under the drug laws." Id at 654 (Cudahy concurring).
"e Section 881(a)(4) provides that "conveyances ...which are used, or are intended ...to facilitate the transport, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment" of illegal drugs
are subject to forfeiture. 21 USC § 881(a)(4) (emphasis added).
" See Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 634 (1886) (stating that forfeiture, "though
technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one"). See also One
1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029 (noting the need for a substantial connection
between the property and the "underlying criminal activity").
" 49 USC § 781 made unlawful the facilitation of the transport, carrying, or conveyance of any contraband article and defined contraband articles to include illegal narcotics.
49 USC § 781 (1988). 49 USC § 782 provided for forfeiture of any vehicle used in violation
of Section 781, with exceptions not pertinent to this Comment. 49 USC § 782 (1988). Both
Sections were repealed in 1994. 108 Stat 1379 (1994).
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782, like Section 881(a)(4), applied to vehicles used to facilitate
the transport, carrying, or conveyance of illegal narcotics.1 9
Under Sections 781 and 782, courts determined that the use
of a vehicle solely to commute to the scene of a crime did not
justify forfeiture.2 For instance, in Platt v United States,2' a
car was used to drive to a drug store where an illegal prescription for morphine was filled.2 The court held that such automobile usage was not "facilitation" within the meaning of the statute and that "[aiscribing such a meaning to the use of the word
'facilitate' would raise grave doubts over the constitutionality of
the statute on the ground of vagueness and indefiniteness."'
Citing Platt, the Ninth Circuit in Howard v United States24 similarly reasoned that an automobile was merely an arbitrary
method of transportation, and the ease or difficulty of the illegal
activity was not affected by the manner in which the party
reached the scene of the crime. 5
The precedent of Howard and Platt, however, does not bind
the courts' interpretation of Section 881(a)(4).2 s Sections 781 and
782, unlike Section 881(a)(4), did not contain the phrase "in any
manner." 2 Many courts have held that the addition of this
phrase indicates that Congress intended to loosen the causal
connection required for forfeiture and to expand the government's
right of forfeiture in drug cases.2" Thus, although Howard and
Platt shed some light on Section 881(a)(4) cases, they are not
dispositive.

" See id.
20 See Platt v United States, 163 F2d 165, 167 (10th Cir 1947). See also Howard v
United States, 423 F2d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir 1970).
21 163 F2d 165 (10th Cir 1947).
22 Id at 166-67.
23 Id at 167.
24 423 F2d 1102 (9th Cir 1970).
Id at 1103-04.

See United States v One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F2d 228, 230 (5th Cir
1982); United States v One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d 500, 502 (5th Cir 1981)
(rejecting Section 781 cases as precedents in a Section 881(a)(4) case); United States v One
1974 Cadillac EldoradoSedan, 548 F2d 421, 425 (2d Cir 1977); United States v One 1987
Ford F.350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F Supp 554, 559 (D Kan 1990).
27 Section 881(a)(4) provides that "conveyances ...which are used, or intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transport, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment" of illegal drugs are subject to forfeiture. 21 USC § 881(a)(4) (emphasis added).
28 See One 1979 Mercury CougarXR-7, 666 F2d at 230 (holding that the "in
any manner" language stretches Section 881(a)(4) "substantially farther" than Sections 781-82).
See also One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d at 502; Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d at
423-25; United States v One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 563 F Supp 470, 473-74 (E D Pa 1983).
'
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Substantial Connection Test

Generally, forfeiture is disfavored, and statutes providing for
forfeiture are strictly construed.29 Concerns about the potentially arbitrary exercise of government power have traditionally limited the scope of civil forfeiture."0 In accordance with this basic
principle of strict construction, some courts have determined that
Section 881(a)(4) should be narrowly construed.3
Some of these courts have found that Congress intended to
require a "substantial connection" between the forfeited property
and the underlying criminal activity.3 2 These courts, while finding that the legislative history of Section 881"'itself sheds little
light on the scope of the facilitation clause,34 have looked to the
legislative history of the Psychotropic Substances Act (the
"PSA"),3 5 an amendment to the Act.36 The PSA added Section
881(a)(6), a complementary provision to Section 881(a)(4),3 7 providing for the forfeiture of money or other valuable objects nego-

One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d at 501, citing United States v One 1936
Model Ford Deluxe V-8 Coach, 307 US 219, 226 (1939).
30 United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 655 (7th Cir 1993) (Cudahy concurring).
3, See, for example, United States v One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick. Up, 769 F2d 525, 526
n 3 (8th Cir 1985).
32 See United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d 1026, 1029-30 (1st Cir
1980). See also United States v 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d 947,
953 (4th Cir 1985).
"3 The House Committee Report accompanying the original Section 881 states:
[Piroperty to be forfeited ... include[s] ... equipment used, or intended for use,
in manufacturing, handling, or conveying controlled substances in violation of
the act .... Also subject to forfeiture are all conveyances used, or intended for
use, to transport or conceal such violative property.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, HR Rep No 91-1444, 91st
Cong, 2d Sess (1970), reprinted in 1970 USCCAN 4566, 4623 (cited in note 2). Judge
Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit believes that this language indicates that Congress originally intended only the "forfeiture of vehicles used for the actual transportation of drugs."
Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 654 (Cudahy concurring).
3 See One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F2d at 526 n 3.
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-633, 92 Stat 3768 (1978).
See One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029. See also 1966 Beechcraft Air.
craft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d at 953.
"7 Section 881(a)(6), however, lacks the "in any manner" language of Section
881(a)(4).
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tiated in exchange for drugs.3 8 The explanatory statement to the
PSA states:
[Ilt is the intent of these provisions that property would
be forfeited only if there is a substantial connection between the
property and the underlying criminal activi3 9
ty ....
Some courts have interpreted this statement to mean that Congress intended to require a "substantial connection" for all forfeitures under Section 881(a)(4).4 °
1. The basic substantialconnection test: United States v One
1972 Datsun and United States v One 1976 Ford F-150 PickUp.
In United States v One 1972 Datsun,4 ' the District Court for
the District of New Hampshire determined that a vehicle must
have a "substantial and/or instrumental connection" to the illicit
activity to be subject to forfeiture.42 Applying this standard, the
court held that forfeiture is inappropriate under Section 881(a)(4)
where the vehicle was only used to transport the person to the
site of the criminal activity.43 Because the government did not
allege that the car in Datsun was part of an ongoing criminal
enterprise, the court did not believe that "forfeiture of the vehicle
[would] help to prevent the illegal sale of narcotics any more
than forfeiture of any number of claimant's personal effects
which facilitate his ability to deal with such commonplace and
everyday problems as transportation."" The court noted that
"[t]here is little activity which is not 'facilitated' by the use of a
car in some fashion."4 5

' Rejecting the substantial connection standard, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the
legislative history of the PSA as pertaining exclusively to Section 881(a)(6). See United
States v 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F2d 725, 727 (5th Cir 1982) (per curiam).
The court reasoned that the "amendment's legislative history makes no mention of using
the same test for other forfeiture actions and the legislative history of § 881 is devoid of
any mention of a 'substantial connection' test." Id.
" Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and
III, 95th Cong, 2d Sess, in 124 Cong Rec S 17647 (Oct 7, 1978), reprinted in 1978
USCCAN 9518, 9522 (emphasis added).
40 See 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d at 953. See also One
1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029.
' 378 F Supp 1200 (D NH 1974) ("Datsun").
42 Id at 1204.
41

Id at 1206.

4 Id at 1205.

"' Datsun, 378 F Supp at 1206.
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Other courts have adopted the reasoning in Datsun.46 In
United States v One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up,4" for example,
the Eighth Circuit adopted the substantial connection test and
held that evidence of a single trip with a truck to a marijuana
field, in the absence of evidence that the vehicle transported supplies to be used for the marijuana crop, was too tenuous to warrant forfeiture.4" The court stated:
[There was little showing, apart from a singular episode of transportation, that use of the truck was an
"integral part" of Hudson's marijuana operation.... [W]e do not believe that the forfeiture statute

was meant to support divestiture of private property
based on an insubstantialconnection between the vehicle and the illegal activity ...

..

The court reasoned that mere suspicion would not support forfeiture, and the facts of the case did not show that the truck facilitated
the illegal activity or was "substantially associated" with
0
it.

5

2. "Antecedent relationship" variation of the substantial
connection test.
Other courts have adopted a variant of the substantial connection test, best denoted as the "antecedent relationship" test.5'
This test requires an antecedent relationship between the vehicle
and the illegal drug transaction in order for the vehicle to have
"facilitated" the transaction under Section 881.52 Under this
analysis, forfeiture is inappropriate when the vehicle's only involvement with the crime occurs after the transaction. 3

46 See, for example, United States v One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick.Up, 769 F2d 525 (8th

Cir 1985). Other courts have also adopted versions of the substantial connection test. See
United States v Schifferli, 895 F2d 987, 990 (4th Cir 1990) (adopting the "substantial connection" test in a Section 881(a)(7) forfeiture case); United States v 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d 947, 953 (4th Cir 1985); United States v One 1972
Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1026, 1029 (lst Cir 1980).
7 769 F2d 525 (8th Cir 1988).
48 Id at 527.
9 Id at 527 (emphasis added).
'o Id.
"' See, for example, One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029-30. Accord United
States v One 1981 Ford F.100 Pickup Truck, 577 F Supp 221, 222 (D Mass 1983).
12 See One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1030.
" Id at 1029.
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For example, in United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette,54 the car in question was used to retrieve the cash proceeds of an earlier drug transaction.55 The First Circuit stated
that it could find "no decision upholding forfeiture on the basis of
the facilitation clause in which there was not an antecedent relationship between the vehicle and the sale of narcotics."" The
court proceeded to hold that Congress did not intend for "minimal involvement," such as the subsequent transport of proceeds,
to trigger forfeiture.57 Thus the court found that the car did not
facilitate the transaction and therefore was not subject to forfeiture.5" While the court stated that the absence of an antecedent
relationship rendered the causal connection too insubstantial to
warrant forfeiture," it did not address the substantiality of the
antecedent relationship necessary for forfeiture. 0
While some courts have followed the First Circuit's reasoning
in Corvette as a modified test to determine the required nexus for
forfeiture,61 other courts have explicitly rejected the antecedent
relationship test, 2 criticizing it as drawing an unnecessary and
irrelevant temporal distinction. 3 For example, the antecedent
relationship test would presumably draw a distinction between

"
17

625 F2d 1026 (1st Cir 1980).
Id at 1027-28.
Id at 1029.

Id at 1030.

One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029-30. The court hypothesized that in
the absence of an antecedent relationship, the car might only be used weeks or months
after the illegal transaction. Id at 1030.
69 Id.
60 The First Circuit explicitly left open the question of whether a vehicle is subject to
forfeiture solely because of its use in transporting participants to the scene of an illicit
drug transaction. Id at 1030 n 5. The District Court of Massachusetts, claiming to follow
the First Circuit's antecedent relationship test, required an antecedent relationship but
did not require that the antecedent relationship constitute a "substantial connection."
United States v One 1981 Ford F-1O0 Pickup Truck, 577 F Supp at 223. The court ignored
the substantiality of the antecedent connection and instead applied the "in any manner"
standard. The court held that a vehicle used solely to commute to the scene of a drug deal
had the requisite antecedent relationship to the crime and that the relationship constituted facilitation under the "in any manner" test. Id.
6" See United States v One 1981 Ford F.100 Pickup Truck, 577 F Supp 221, 222 (D
Mass 1983); United States v One 1979 Lincoln Continental, 574 F Supp 156, 159-60 (N D
Ohio 1983). Accord United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 575 F2d 344 (2d Cir
1978) (per curiam) (reversing forfeiture of car used to drive drug dealer to a basketball
game after transaction was completed).
62 See, for example, United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 654 (7th Cir
1993). Accord United States v One 1983 Pontiac Grand Prix, 604 F Supp 893, 896 (E D
Mich 1985) (holding that the intended transport of profits from an illegal transaction does
constitute a sufficient nexus for forfeiture).
' Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 654.
"
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the use of a vehicle to commute to the illegal transaction and the
use of the same vehicle to commute from the transaction, though
both halves of the commute could be considered equally necessary to the transaction and thus equally "facilitating."
"In Any Manner" Standard

C.

Several courts have rejected the substantial connection test
in favor of a broader "in any manner" standard.' These courts
have reasoned that by including the "in any manner" language in
Section 881(a)(4), Congress intended to broaden the scope of forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4) to strengthen law enforcement.65
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on the House
Report accompanying the Act," which stated:
This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive
fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the
United States ...(2) through providing more effective

means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control. 7
The Fifth Circuit found that this language evidenced an intent to
expand the scope of vehicle forfeiture and that "[t]o hold otherwise would negate the need for and purpose of the new statute."68
Courts applying the "in any manner" standard have explicitly rejected the necessity of a "substantial connection," holding
instead that the. use of a vehicle to facilitate an illegal drug
transaction "in any manner" justifies forfeiture.69 Neither the
language of the statute nor its legislative history mentions a
"substantial connection"; this term is referred to only in the legis-

See, for example, United States v 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F2d 725, 727
(5th Cir 1982); United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d 421, 423 (2d
Cir 1977). See also Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 654.

See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 654; United States v One 1977 Cadillac Coupe
DeVille, 644 F2d 500, 502 (5th Cir 1981); Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d at 425. The Second
Circuit, however, could not find any legislative history to explain the addition of Section

881. Id.
67

One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d at 502.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, HR Rep No 91-

1444, 91st Congress, 2d Session (1970), reprinted in 1970 USCCAN at 4566, 4567 (cited in
note 2).
69

One 1977 CadillacCoupe DeVille, 644 F2d at 502.
See, for example, United States v One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F2d 1297, 1304

(5th Cir 1983); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F2d at 727; Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d
at 423.
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lative history of an amendment to the Act. Thus many courts
have found that any substantial connection requirement is limited to that amendment.7 ° For example, the Seventh Circuit recently stated that "[tihe language 'or in any manner to facilitate'
indicates that Congress did not want the courts to use their ingenuity to trim the statute to 'reasonable' proportions."7
In United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan,72 the
Second Circuit held that Congress intended to extend the reach
of Section 881(a)(4) beyond the substantial connection boundary
erected in Datsun.73 To give full effect to the broad congressional
intent to reduce the profits of drug dealers, the court was "loathe
to make the forfeiture depend upon the accident of whether dope
is physically present in the vehicle."74 Applying its broadened
standard, the court in Eldorado Sedan held that the use of a
vehicle to transport parties to the scene of a sale or to a meeting
75
where the sale is proposed is sufficient to warrant forfeiture.
In Eldorado Sedan, the vehicle was used to commute to an
initial meeting at which a drug deal was proposed and rejected.7" The court pointed out that it was neither unusual nor dispositive that the initial discussion did not result in an immediate
sale, especially since drug traffickers are often wary of
strangers.7 7 The initial meeting led to further meetings and to
the eventual sale, and thus the court found that the vehicle used
to transport the parties to the first meeting was subject to forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4).7"
Following the Second Circuit's Eldorado Sedan decision,
several courts have similarly used the addition of the phrase "in
any manner" to extend Section 881(a)(4) forfeiture beyond the

7

See, for example, 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F2d at 727 ("[PSA's] legisla-

tive history makes no mention of using the same [substantial connection] test for other

forfeiture actions and the legislative history of § 881 is devoid of any mention of a 'substantial connection' test.").
71 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 654.
72 548 F2d 421 (2d Cir 1977) ("Eldorado Sedan").
Id at 423-25 (labeling the Datsun decision "perforce suspect").
74 Id at 426.
75 Id.
One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d at 422.
7 Id at 427.
78 Id. Following Eldorado Sedan, courts have held that forfeiture is proper where a
vehicle is used merely to commute to the site of a meeting eventually leading to an illegal
drug transaction. See United States v One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 563 F Supp 470, 473-74 (E
D Pa 1983) (involving a car used for commuting to meetings which led to the sale). See
also United States v One 1987 Ford F.350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F Supp 554, 558-59 (D Kan
1990) (pertaining to commuting to negotiations).
76
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boundaries of other civil forfeiture. 9 Under the "in any manner"
standard, forfeiture is warranted where the nexus between the
vehicle and the illegal transaction is more than "incidental or
fortuitous."" Under this analysis, courts have uniformly found

that the use of a car to transport parties to the site of a drug
transaction constitutes a sufficient nexus for forfeiture. 81 The

Fifth Circuit has also extended the "in any manner" standard to
affirm the forfeiture of a vehicle used in laying the groundwork
for a future drug operation.8 2
Recently, in United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner,' the
Seventh Circuit, in adopting the "in any manner" interpretation
of Section 881(a)(4), distinguished "between personal use unrelated to drugs and [drug business] use."" Though vehicles used for
"personal" use might indirectly "facilitate" a drug dealer's illegal
transactions, the court concluded that such vehicles were beyond
the reach of the statute. 5 The court hypothesized that without
such a limit on "facilitation," items like groceries and clothing
might be subject to civil forfeiture.'
On the other hand, this modified test encompasses all vehicles used for "business,"" including those used to transport par-

"' See, for example, United States v One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d 500,
503 (5th Cir 1981). The Northern District of Illinois held that a "substantial connection"
was required for forfeiture under 18 USC § 981, a civil forfeiture statute for property used
in money laundering, because the statute lacked the phrase "in any manner." United
States v One 1989 JaguarXJ6, 1993 WL 157630, *2-3 (N D Ill 1993). However, the court
opined that a less rigorous "in any manner" standard should be applied to Section
881(a)(4) forfeitures. Id at *2.
' United States v One Parcel of Real Estate Known as 916 DouglasAvenue, 903 F2d
490, 493-94 (7th Cir 1990) (applying the "in any manner" test to Section 881(a)(7)).
", See, for example, United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 652-54 (7th Cir
1993); United States v One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F2d 1133, 1137-38 (6th Cir 1989) (concerning commuting to transaction); United States v One 1981 Ford F-100 Pickup Truck, 577 F
Supp 221, 223 (D Mass 1983); United States v One 1979 Lincoln Continental,574 F Supp
156, 159-60 (N D Ohio 1983) (upholding forfeiture where car transported both party and
drug-testing equipment); One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F2d at 503.
82 See United States v One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F2d 228, 230 (5th Cir
1982) (holding that a vehicle used in searching for an airfield and renting storage space
and equipment for a marijuana operation has sufficient nexus and is subject to forfeiture).
The Fifth Circuit distinguished an earlier Section 781 case which had held that the mere
performance of a useful function did not itself support a finding of facilitation. Id, distinguishing United States v One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette Automobile, 496 F2d 210 (5th Cir
1974).
"

9 F3d 651 (7th Cir 1993).

'4

Id at 653-54.

"
88

Id at 653.
Id.

Judge Cudahy, concurring in Toyota 4Runner, pointed out the possible difficulty of
distinguishing between business and pleasure uses, noting that "[e]ven on vacation or
87
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ties to a meeting at which a future drug transaction is arranged.8" The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the vehicle "facilitated" the conspirator's presence at the meeting and thus facilitated any drug deals that might arise from the meeting.89 The
court also likened the situation to the formation of an executory
contract for a future drug delivery and rationalized that the sale
actually occurred at the initial meeting with consummation to
9
ensue.

0

D. "Mislabeled" Approaches
Some courts have claimed to apply the substantial connection standard for Section 881(a)(4) forfeiture, yet they have
adopted the reasoning of courts applying the "in any manner"
test.9 ' These "mislabeled" approaches exacerbate the existing
confusion in the current law.
Several courts purporting to apply the substantial connection
test have nonetheless relied on EldoradoSedan, the leading case
rejecting that test, to determine what constitutes a substantial
connection.2 For example, the Fourth Circuit professed to apply
the "substantial connection" test. Contrary to other cases using
this test, however, the court held that a vehicle used only to
transport conspirators to the scene of a drug sale or to a preliminary meeting is substantially connected to the sale and subject to
forfeiture.93 In reaching its holding, the court relied on the Sec-

going to the movies, dealers may be on the lookout for business." Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d
at 655 (Cudahy concurring).
Id at 652-54.
Id at 652.
90 Id at 653.
" See United States v 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d 947 (4th
Cir 1985); United States v One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d 1424 (11th Cir 1983). The
First Circuit found Eldorado Sedan, which explicitly rejects the substantial connection
test, "consonant with Congress's statement that 'it is the intent of these provisions that
property would be forfeited only if there is a substantial connection between the property
and the underlying criminal activity.'" One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029.
92 See, for example, One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d at 1426-27; One 1987 Ford F350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F Supp at 558-59 (citing Eldorado Sedan, the court found that the
use of a vehicle to commute to an initial meeting where a possible drug transaction was
discussed rendered the vehicle subject to forfeiture under the "substantial connection"
standard, even though the deal was eventually finalized weeks later in a different transactional form than initially discussed). See also One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F2d at 1137-38
(holding that the mere use of a vehicle to commute to the site of an illegal transaction is
sufficient to justify forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4) "even under the 'substantial
connection' standard," but citing as authority cases that rely on Eldorado Sedan).
" 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F2d at 953.
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ond Circuit's reasoning in Eldorado Sedan. 4 The Fourth Circuit
did not attempt to reconcile its application of a substantial connection test with the reasoning of Eldorado Sedan, which explicitly rejected the substantial connection standard in favor of the
broader "in any manner" interpretation.
The Eleventh Circuit similarly claimed to adopt the substantial connection test, yet it relied on the reasoning of cases supporting the "in any manner" test." In one case, the court stated:
"To support a forfeiture under [Section] 881, the government
must demonstrate probable cause for the belief that a substantial
connection exists between the vehicle to be forfeited and the relevant criminal activity."96 However, the court proceeded to hold
that the use of a vehicle to transport the "pivotal figure in the
transaction" several hundred miles to the scene of an attempted
transaction was sufficient to support forfeiture under the substantial connection test, citing Eldorado Sedan and the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, which followed Eldorado Sedan.97
II. PRINCIPLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT APPROACHES
The various judicial approaches to Section 881(a)(4) attempt
to deter drug traffickers and deprive them of their operating tools
without extending Section 881(a)(4) beyond constitutional and
practical boundaries. Even courts applying the "in any manner"
approach have recognized limitations on the scope of Section
881;98 an expansive literal reading of the statute would unreasonably extend its scope, rendering it inconsistent with the limited congressional intent to crack down on the "operating tools" of
the narcotics trade. The various approaches attempt to draw a
clear line beyond which forfeiture would no longer serve congressional intent.
The discord among the courts stems in part from the indefinite nature of the term "facilitate" as used in the Act. When illegal drugs are not physically present in a vehicle, whether that
vehicle "facilitates" a drug transaction is a question of degree.99
Id.
"

One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d at 1426.

'

Id.

" One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d at 1427, citing One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille,
644 F2d at 503.
" See, for example, United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 653-54 (7th Cir
1993).
" The Southern District of New York discussed the difficulty of defining "facilitation":
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One interpretation of "facilitation" would encompass any activity
making the prohibited conduct less difficult, or more free from
obstruction or hindrance."' Other courts, however, have pointed out that under such a broad definition, basics of life such as
food and clothing could be considered "facilitating."' This difficulty in adequately defining "facilitation" has led the courts to try
various standards in applying Section 881(a)(4).
The names given the various approaches are largely irrelevant;0 2 the important distinctions lie in the reasoning the
courts actually employ in applying the standards. Courts professing to apply the substantial connection test, yet following the
reasoning of the "in any manner" test, have blurred the practical
distinctions between the two;' 3 indeed, no distinction separates
the tests if the threshold for substantial connection is so low that
any connection is "substantial. 0 4 Conversely, courts applying
the "in any manner" standard have recognized practical and constitutional limitations to such an interpretation, and these limitations could be considered a form of a "substantial connection"

requirement.0 5
The essential difference between the approaches, however
named, is the actual causal nexus required for forfeiture and the
manner of determining this nexus.0 ' The more tenuous the

[Wihether any particular connection of a vehicle with contraband, where the
contraband is not in the vehicle or in the possession of the occupant of the vehicle, constitutes facilitation, is a question of degree, which is in turn a question of
fact not readily susceptible to generalization.
United States v One Dodge Coupe, 43 F Supp 60, 61 (S D NY 1942), quoted in United
States v One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette Automobile, 496 F2d 210, 212 (5th Cir 1974).
"o See United States v One 1977 Lincoln Mark V. Coupe, 643 F2d 154, 157 (3d Cir
1981).
101 See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653; United States v One 1972 Datsun, 378 F Supp
1200, 1206 (D NH 1974).
"o See United States v One Parcel of Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, 903
F2d 490, 494 (7th Cir 1990) (stating that "although the Fourth Circuit has adopted a 'substantial connection' test, the differences between this approach and our own ["in any manner test"] appear largely to be semantic rather than practical").
"o1Accord id (stating that "the distinction between a 'substantial connection' test and
the 'in any manner, or part' language ... is blurry at best").
" See, for example, United States v One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F2d 1133, 1136 (6th Cir
1989); United States v One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d 1424, 1426-27 (11th Cir 1983);
United States v One 1987 Ford F-350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F Supp 554, 558-59 (D Kan 1990).
"05See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653-54 (recognizing that the connecting "chain" between the item and the transaction can be "too long"). The necessity of a shorter chain
could be considered, in effect, a "substantial connection" requirement.
106 Contrast Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653-54, with Datsun, 378 F Supp at 1206, with
United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d 421, 426-27 (2d Cir 1977),
with United States v One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F2d 525, 527-28 (8th Cir 1988),
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connection allowed, the more likely it is that all vehicles used in
the drug trade will be forfeited. A more tenuous connection, however, also increases the chance that other vehicles, not necessarily tools of the trade, may fall within the broad grasp of the statute.
Under any interpretation, the scope of Section 881(a)(4) cannot extend beyond constitutional boundaries. The Due Process
Clause protects individuals from forfeiture of their property without due process of law, ensuring that the government cannot
arbitrarily or indiscriminately confiscate property." 7 For forfeiture to comport with constitutional standards, some particularized connection is necessary. In applying due process analysis to
real estate forfeiture proceedings, the courts have balanced three
considerations: the property interest at stake; the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards;
and the government's interest, including any burdens that additional procedures may entail.0 8
Other constitutional protections further limit the scope of
civil forfeiture.0 9 For example, the Supreme Court recently held
that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to
Section 881(a)(4) forfeiture proceedings, noting that the alleged
remedial goals of the statute do not exclude it from constitutional
review."0
While the "in any manner" standard does not necessarily
violate constitutional requirements, an expansive literal interpretation could violate the Constitution."' At some level, almost
all of a person's possessions "facilitate" that person's conscious
actions in some manner, though the facilitation may be extremely
tenuous." 2 Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit hypothesized
with United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d 1026, 1028-30 (1st Cir 1980).
107 The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." US Const, Amend V. "[Piroceedings instituted for
the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed
by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal' for Fifth Amendment [due process] purposes." United States v United States Coin & Currency, 401 US
715' 718 (1971), quoting Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 634 (1886) (emphasis in original).
10 United States v Premises and Real Property at 4492 S Livonia Road, 889 F2d 1258,
1264 (2d Cir 1989), citing Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976).
" See Austin v United States, 113 S Ct 2801, 2812 (1993); United States v Lasanta,
978 F2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir 1992) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections against
warrantless searches and seizures applied in civil forfeiture settings).
110

Austin, 113 S Ct at 2811-12.

9' See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653 (observing that groceries and clothing can be
considered "facilitating").
112 For example, a television show may have provided inspiration for the transaction;
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that without some requirement of a "closer and clearer nexus
between the drug transaction and the forfeited property," merely
thinking about a drug transaction while driving a car might subject the car to forfeiture.' 13 The "in any manner" test can easily
degenerate into a "but for" causation test; a "but for" causation
test should not serve as the criterion for determining facilitation
because such a test removes from the statute the requirement
that the car be used, or intended for use, in specific ways.
The potential degeneration of the "in any manner" standard
into "but for" causation also poses possible constitutional problems. Strict "but for" causation would encompass many vehicles
so tenuously connected that such a standard would violate constitutional due process; the risk of arbitrary forfeiture would.
substantially outweigh any governmental interest in forfeiture.
Furthermore, the practically limitless nature of "but for" causation might violate the Excessive Fines Clause as well. As the
Second Circuit stated:
While Congress may have intended civil forfeiture to be
"a powerful weapon in the war on drugs," it would, indeed, be a Pyrrhic victory for the country, if the
government's relentless and imaginative use of that
weapon were to leave the Constitution itself a casual4
11

ty.

III. AN INTENT-FOCUSED APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE
SCOPE OF SECTION 881(A)(4)
One possible means to alleviate the current judicial difficulties in applying Section 881(a)(4) would be to institute an intentbased standard. This test would essentially impart the intent of
the vehicle operator to the vehicle. The intent of the vehicle operator would serve as the nexus for forfeiture. This proposed test
would ensure the proper nexus in each individual case by examining the particular facts of each case, rather than attempting to
draw arbitrary generalizations as current courts have done. Thus
this approach would avoid any constitutional infirmity. Furthermore, an intent-focused standard properly recognizes the quasi-

a stereo may have placed a person in the proper mood to best accomplish the deal; and a
microwave may have contributed to the necessary nourishment and energy required to
carry out the act. See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653; Datsun, 378 F Supp at 1206.
1
Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 655 (Cudahy concurring).
..
4 Lasanta, 978 F2d at 1305 (citations omitted).
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criminal nature of civil forfeiture by incorporating intent into the
forfeiture determination. An intent-based standard fulfills the
intent of Congress to deter drug dealers and deprive them of the
tools of their trade while maintaining the necessary protections
for those individuals incidentally and "unintentionally" snared in
the forfeiture net.
A.

Incorporating Intent as a Determinative Factor in Forfeiture

Regardless of how facilitation is defined, clearly some nexus
between the vehicle and the illegal transaction must exist for
facilitation to have occurred under Section 881(a)(4). 115 The
courts have held that certain uses of a vehicle in connection with
an illegal drug transaction are clearly facilitating. For example,
facilitating uses include use of the vehicle to transport the contraband; use of the vehicle as a storage site for the contraband;
and use of the vehicle as the site of the transaction.1 16 However,
where such obvious and direct facilitation is not present, the
courts should scrutinize the intent of the party using the vehicle
to determine whether facilitation has occurred.
A case-by-case, intent-focused analysis avoids an arbitrary
definition of facilitation that does not refer to the particular facts
of a case. The current approaches generalize as to whether certain uses of a vehicle, such as commuting to a drug negotiation,
do or do not constitute facilitation under Section 881(a)(4). Unfortunately, the approaches ignore the subjective nature of facilitation. Courts have recognized that facilitation is a question of
degree,117 and the subjective intent of the vehicle operator
should be crucial to the determination. Similar uses may not be
equally facilitating because the intent of the operators may differ.

"' See United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 653 (7th Cir 1993); United
States v One Parcel of Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, 903 F2d 490, 493-94
(7th Cir 1990); United States v One 1976 Ford F.150 Pick.Up, 769 F2d 525, 527 (8th Cir
1988); United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d 1026, 1028-30 (1st Cir 1980);
United States v One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F2d 421, 426-27 (2d Cir 1977);
United States v One 1972 Datsun, 378 F Supp 1200, 1206 (D NH 1972).
"' See Datsun, 378 F Supp at 1202 ("It is clear that any intentional transportation or
concealment of contraband in a conveyance, no matter how small the amount, will subject
the conveyance to forfeiture. In addition, use of a vehicle as a place for conducting negotiations for or transacting any portion of a sale is sufficient to subject the vehicle to forfeiture.") (citations omitted). See also United States v One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644
F2d 500, 503 (5th Cir 1981) (holding that even under 49 USC § 781, conveyances used to
house the transaction itself or to transport the contraband were facilitating).
"' See United States v One Dodge Coupe, 43 F Supp 60, 61 (S D NY 1942). See also
United States v One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette Automobile, 496 F2d 210, 212 (5th Cir 1974).
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Section 881(a)(4) states that vehicles "intended for use ... to
facilitate" an illegal drug transaction are subject to forfeiture,
thus denoting intent as a criterion for forfeiture."' Courts have
recognized that in some cases, actual physical use may be secondary to intent.'19 Moreover, the language of Section 881(a)(4) literally requires only an intent to use the vehicle for an illicit purpose. 20 In cases in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether facilitation actually occurred, the propriety of
forfeiture should turn on the intended use of the vehicle.
Under the proposed intent standard, the key inquiry is
whether the vehicle was intended to be used in advancing the
illegal transaction. If the vehicle was intended for such a purpose, then the vehicle should be subject to forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4). Furthermore, where a court finds an intent to use
the vehicle to facilitate, facilitation can be presumed. 12 ' In other
words, the intent of the owner can serve as the "connection" between the vehicle and the illegal transaction, even where such a
nexus might not be readily apparent from the objective facts.
Of course, at some level, any use of a vehicle is intentional.
However, the inquiry under this proposed test focuses on the
planning stage of the transaction. For example, if the plan to
travel to an illegal drug transaction required the use of an automobile, then that automobile would have been intentionally used
and thus would be subject to forfeiture.'22 By contrast, if no
plan to use the vehicle in an illegal drug transaction existed, but
rather a spontaneous drug negotiation occurred in which the

.. Courts have focused on the intent phrase of the statute in cases involving sham
drugs and situations in which the intervention of government agents prevents completion
of the drug transaction. See, for example, United States v One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado,
705 F2d 862, 862-63 (6th Cir 1983) (per curiam) (concentrating on the intent phrase
where sham drugs were involved); United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 483 F
Supp 629, 632 (D Mass 1980), rev'd, 625 F2d 1026 (1st Cir 1980) ("It is reasonable to infer
that Congress included mere 'intent' as a pivotal factor permitting forfeiture in order not
to discourage government agents' intervention prior to the completion of a drug transaction."); United States v One 1945 Douglas Aircraft, 461 F Supp 324, 325 (W D Mo 1978)
(scrutinizing the intent phrase of the statute in a case where a plane was intended to be
used to transport marijuana).
"' See One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, 705 F2d at 863. See also note 11 and accompanying text.
120 See note 16 and accompanying text.
121 This situation is analogous to false advertising cases where, if an intent to confuse
exists, confusion is presumed. See McNeilab, Inc. v American Home Products, 501 F Supp
517, 529-30 (S D NY 1980). See also Resource Developers, Inc. v Statue of Liberty-Ellis
Island Foundation, 926 F2d 134, 140 (2d Cir 1991).
"2 This concept extends to substitute vehicles that replace the original vehicle intended to be used. Such substitute vehicles have the same "intent" as the ones they replace.
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vehicle was incidentally involved, then the operator of the vehicle
would lack the requisite intent, and thus the vehicle would not
be subject to forfeiture." 3
The determination of intent under this proposed test should
focus on whether the use of the vehicle was designed and not
merely fortuitous. Planned or designed use would indicate a premeditated, particularized connection between the vehicle and the
transaction that would satisfy even the most stringent "substantial connection" test. On the other hand, an unplanned, fortuitous involvement of the vehicle in the drug transaction would
suggest that any facilitation provided was unintentional and
incidental, and that the vehicle was not significantly linked to
the transaction.. In such a situation, the balance should weigh
strongly against forfeiture of the vehicle, unless the vehicle actually transported the drugs or performed some other integral task
in the transaction constituting facilitation even in the absence of
intent.
This proposed intent-based approach to Section 881(a)(4) is
similar to the business/pleasure distinction applied by the Seventh Circuit. 1 4 That distinction, which subjects only a drug
dealer's "business" vehicles to forfeiture, implicitly turns on intent. Indeed, no clear distinction between drug business tools and
personal items can exist without reference to intent. As Judge
Cudahy recognized in his concurrence in Toyota 4Runner, a vehicle does not inherently possess a "business" or "pleasure" quality. 2 Instead, the classification of a vehicle as a business or
pleasure item hinges upon the intended use of the vehicle.
B.

The Quasi-Criminal Nature of Section 881(a)(4) Forfeiture

Courts have recognized that civil forfeiture, "though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal
one."' 26 While civil forfeiture does not require an underlying

"= Under this intent-based inquiry, the fact that a particular vehicle is not unique, or
that another vehicle could have performed the task, does not render the use of the vehicle
unintentional. See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 652-53. Indeed, forfeiture of only indispensable vehicles would eviscerate the statute and thwart the congressional intent to deprive
drug dealers of all the tools of their trade, not only the indispensable ones. See id at 653
(noting the impossibility of proving that the drug dealer could not have used a rental car
or public transportation instead of his own car).
2
See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653-54.
125 Id at 655 (Cudahy concurring).
1
Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 634 (1886).
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criminal conviction,'27 it is premised on an illegal act that requires criminal intent.128 Forfeiture is in effect a punitive monetary fine for the crime.'29 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
the criminal nature of Section 881(a)(4), 3 ° and the statute itself, unlike traditional forfeiture statutes, expressly provides for
an "innocent owner" defense, an exemption which focuses on the
owner's culpability."'
Criminal cases generally require intent, or mens rea, 32 for
conviction. Thus, in accord with the quasi-criminal nature of the
statute, facilitation should rarely be found in the absence of intent. In effect, a mens rea element should be factored into Section
881(a)(4). Of course, the vehicle itself is incapable of mens rea,
but the operator's intent with regard to the vehicle can serve as a

proxy for the vehicle's intent.'
This intent-based test for forfeiture draws support from the
"innocent owner" exception in the statute. The "innocent owner"
exception recognizes the inequity of seizing a vehicle where the
owner lacks culpability. 1 4 Because the vehicle itself is accused
of wrongdoing in these cases, the innocent owner defense essentially imputes the owner's innocence to the vehicle. Similar reasoning would allow the innocent intentions of the vehicle opera-

tor at the time of operation to protect the vehicle from forfeiture.

[27

One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v United States, 783 F2d 759, 762 (8th Cir 1986).

[2

See 21 USC § 881 (1988). See also 49 USC §§ 781-82 (1988); Austin v United

States, 113 S Ct 2801, 2811 (1993); United States v United States Coin & Currency, 401
US 715, 718 (1971).
129Austin, 113 S Ct at 2810-12.
130 Id.
See 21 USC § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988). See also Austin, 113 S Ct at 2810-11.
.32Mens rea is defined as "a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal in131

tent." Black's Law Dictionary 985 (West, 6th ed 1990).
'" This use of intent comports with the legal fiction that the vehicle itself is the
wrongdoer. Because the proceeding is targeted against the vehicle itself on account of its
"wrongdoing," the vehicle should have recourse to the defense that it lacked the mens rea
for the wrongdoing. The driver's intent at the start of the trip can be imparted to the vehicle and serve as the vehicle's intent. If the driver planned for the vehicle to serve a
guilty purpose, then the vehicle should be subject to forfeiture because it now has a
"guilty mind." On the other hand, the vehicle should not be subject to seizure if it was
used innocently, in an undesigned or fortuitous manner. An intent-focused standard extends to vehicles the notion that without guilty intentions, there is no crime and consequently no punishment.
...See 21 USC § 881(a)(4)(C).
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The specific congressional aim of Section 881 was to deprive
drug dealers of the tools of their trade.135 An intent-based standard achieves this goal because drug traffickers will almost always have the requisite illicit intent to satisfy the proposed test.
It is inconceivable that a career drug trafficker would choose the
vehicles used in his business, the "tools of his trade," without
deliberate design. Only unintentionally used vehicles, which cannot be considered "tools of the drug trafficker," are protected from
forfeiture by the intent-based test.
An intent-based standard for civil forfeiture promotes the
policy reasons behind civil forfeiture: deterring drug dealers and
depriving them of their resources.'
Drug dealers would have
few, if any, intent-based defenses because they would hardly be
able to demonstrate that no "plan" motivated their repeated illegal activities, and certainly any plan would include choice of
transportation. A drug dealer would not be able to claim unintentional selection of an automobile for commuting to drug transactions when such transactions are his intended goal.'37 Because the scope of forfeiture as it relates to drug dealers would
resemble current standards, the deterrent and practical effects on
drug dealers would not be weakened by an intent-based standard.
On the other hand, the first-time, or spontaneous, drug user
may receive greater protection under this intent-based test. Individuals who do not actively seek out drug transactions, but instead purchase impulsively, would enjoy some degree of protection from forfeiture because their vehicles might lack the requisite intent if the transaction arose spontaneously. 8' In this respect, an intent-based standard may not be as wide-reaching as
the current standards, especially in comparison to the "in any
manner" test. The congressional intent of the statute, however,
was to deter and attack drug kingpins,' not the infrequent im-

'

United States v 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d 651, 653 (7th Cir 1993).

'' See notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
117 See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653-54 (examining the business/pleasure distinction).

" The protection accorded the impulse buyer would be very limited; regardless of the
level of intent or lack thereof, an intent-focused standard does not protect vehicles directly
used in conducting the transaction. For example, a vehicle used as the site of the transaction or one used to store the illicit drugs would not be protected.
" See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 653. See also Austin v United States, 113 S Ct 2801,
2811 (1993); note 6 and accompanying text.
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pulse buyer. Thus, the potential additional protection accorded to
infrequent users does not thwart congressional intent. " '
An intent-focused reading of the statute also avoids potential
due process pitfalls. Focusing on the wrongdoer's subjective intent would ensure a particularized connection between the vehicle and the illegal transaction, thereby minimizing the possibility
of erroneous or arbitrary forfeiture. An intent-focused standard
thus would incorporate the necessary constitutional protections
without diminishing the effectiveness of the statute with regard
to the drug dealers who are its true targets.
D.

Application of an Intent-Focused Standard

Under an intent-focused reading of Section 881(a)(4), the use
of a vehicle to transport parties to the scene of a drug transaction
would subject the vehicle to forfeiture if: (1) the vehicle directly
facilitated the transaction-for example, by transporting or storing the drugs or by serving as the site of the transaction itself; or
(2) the vehicle was a planned part of the transaction. As a practical matter, vehicles driven by drug dealers to transactions are
planned parts of the illegal activity and hence subject to forfeiture. However, a vehicle that is merely fortuitously involved in a
drug transaction should remain beyond the scope of Section
881(a)(4).14
Scenarios have arisen where the use of a particular automobile could be considered unintended. In United States v 1971
Chevrolet Corvette Automobile,' for example,, the party drove
the vehicle in question to his relative's house, switched vehicles
there for some unknown reason, and subsequently drove to the
transaction in a Ford.4 4 The current approaches require an arbitrary determination as to whether the first of two vehicles used
in reaching the location of a drug negotiation has a sufficient
nexus to the transaction to be considered facilitating. However,
the intent-focused approach would recognize that the intent behind the use of the first car and the reason for the switch should

'" See United States v One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F2d 525, 527 (8th Cir
1988); United States v One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d 1026, 1030 (1st Cir 1980)
(noting that Congress did not intend for "minimal involvement to trigger forfeiture").
"4 See United States v One Parcel of Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, 903
F2d 490, 494 (7th Cir 1990) (holding that even under the "in any manner" test, property
which is merely "fortuitously" involved is exempted from forfeiture); United States v
$10,000 US Currency, 521 F Supp 1253, 1256 (N D Ill 1981).
12 496 F2d 210 (5th Cir 1974).
1
Id at 211.
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properly determine forfeiture in this case. Under an intent-based
standard, this same factual situation might result in forfeiture in
a case where the switch was made as part of a plan to conceal
the party's movements, yet forfeiture might not result in another
case where the first car served a merely incidental purpose as an
arbitrary mode of transportation prior to the actual planned
transaction.144
In application, an intent-focused standard would primarily
provide additional protection to vehicles that are fortuitously
used in drug transactions,145 usually those involving first-time
or infrequent drug users. For example, suppose Jane Doe drives
her car to a pawn shop, intending only to pawn her watch, but
while in the shop the store owner solicits her to engage in a future drug transaction. Assuming Jane could prove that she
lacked illegal intentions in driving the car to the shop,146 this
single use of the vehicle to commute to and from the pawn shop
would not subject the vehicle to forfeiture under an intent-based
standard.'47 By contrast, under many of the current definitions
of facilitation-for example, the "in any manner" test, or a broad
application of the substantial connection test-courts would determine that, because commuting to the scene of a drug transaction constitutes facilitation, the car should be forfeited. Such a
determination unfortunately ignores the fact that the vehicle's
involvement in the drug transaction was unintentional and that
it could hardly be considered a tool of the drug trade.
Under an intent-based test, no distinction would be made
between the transport of the proceeds of the illegal transaction
and antecedent actions.148 The timing of the acts is inconsequential where the requisite intent is present.'49 The proceeds
are a part of the transaction, and the intentional transport of the
proceeds clearly indicates an intent to facilitate the transac" See United States v One Dodge Coupe, 43 F Supp 60, 62 (S D NY 1942) (finding
that the first of two cars used was subject to forfeiture because of the "inescapable inference that the meeting [of the cars] ... was not accidental but prearranged").
"' See 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F2d at 493-94; $10,000 US Currency, 521 F Supp at
1256.
146 Jane could prove that she did not go to the store intending to participate in a drug
transaction by demonstrating, through witness testimony or circumstantial evidence, that
she was unaware that the store owner was a drug dealer.
"' However, after the first visit to the shop, Jane now knows that the store owner is a
drug dealer, and any subsequent trips to the shop during which a drug transaction is arranged or conducted would likely be considered intentional and subject Jane's commuting
vehicle to forfeiture.
148 Contrast One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F2d at 1029.
149 See Toyota 4Runner, 9 F3d at 654.
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tion. 5 ° The use of a vehicle to transport the proceeds is almost
always an intentional, and often crucial, part of the overall conspiracy. It is illogical to consider the transaction "complete" upon
delivery of the contraband,"' and a tremendous loophole in the
statute would exist if a court were to hold that the distribution of
proceeds from the drug transaction does not constitute part of the
entire transaction.
E.

Burden of Proof

In a forfeiture action, the government must only establish
that "probable cause" exists to believe that the vehicle subject to
forfeiture was used to aid the drug transaction.1 52 The probable
cause standard in actions under Section 881(a)(4) is whether
there is "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt supported by less
than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion."' Once
the government establishes probable cause, the owner of the
vehicle has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle was not used in the illegal drug transac5 4
tion.
The proposed intent-based standard would not affect the
burdens of proof. Under an intent-based standard, the showing of
probable cause could easily be met by circumstantial or direct
evidence giving rise to a reasonable belief that the vehicle either
directly facilitated, or was intended to facilitate, the illegal transaction. 55 For example, the use of a vehicle to commute to the
scene of an illegal drug transaction or negotiation would strongly
evidence "intent" to utilize the vehicle in a facilitating manner,

" See id ('[Slurely the getaway driver in a robbery facilitates the robbery even
though his work begins when the robbery is complete.").
'5' Id.
"52
"In all suits or actions ... brought for the forfeiture of any vessel [or] vehicle ...where the property is claimed by any person, the burden of proof shall lie upon
such claimant; ... Provided, That probable cause shall be first shown for the institution
of such suit or action .... ." 19 USC § 1615 (1988) (emphasis in original). See also United
States v One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir 1983); United States v
One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir 1983); United
States v One 1983 Pontiac Gran Prix, 604 F Supp 893, 896 (E D Mich 1985); United States
v One 1981 Ford F-100 Pickup Truck, 577 F Supp 221, 223 (D Mass 1983).
15 See United States v One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F2d 228, 230 n 3 (5th Cir
1982), quoting United States v One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, 614 F2d 983 (5th Cir 1980).
See also One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F2d at 1282.
"5 See One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d at 1427; One 1983 Pontiac Gran Prix, 604 F
Supp at 896.
" See One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F2d at 526 ("The government's initial burden ... may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence.").
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giving the government probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings under Section 881(a)(4).' 56
Once probable cause is established, the burden shifts to the
owner to prove lack of facilitation or intent to facilitate. 5 ' Under an intent-focused standard, the owner could satisfy this burden by proving her "innocent" intentions with regard to the vehicle. Allocating this burden to the owner is especially appropriate
because only the owner knows her own intentions. Because the
owner must carry this burden, guilty vehicles cannot escape forfeiture merely on the basis of equivocal evidence; rather, the
owner must make an affirmative showing of innocence.
While the subjectivity of an intent-focused standard increases the difficulty of administering the test because of the individualized nature of proof, the courts have proven themselves wellequipped to handle intent determinations in criminal cases.'
More importantly, an intent-based system provides greater guarantees of fairness and due process than the arbitrary categorization of current approaches. The subjectivity of intent allows justice to be meted out more equitably on an individual level, not on
the basis of arbitrary distinctions.
CONCLUSION

Civil forfeiture under Section 881(a)(4) requires that some
nexus exist between the forfeited vehicle and the illegal drug
activity. The current approaches to Section 881(a)(4) attempt to
determine the required nexus through arbitrary factual distinctions, resulting in inconsistent holdings. While certain uses of a
vehicle in connection with an illegal drug transaction are indisputably facilitating-for instance, the use of the vehicle as a storage site for the contraband or the use of the vehicle as the site of
the transaction-in many cases such direct facilitation is not
present. In these more complex cases, courts should look to the
intent of the party using the vehicle to determine whether the
vehicle "facilitated" the crime.

"

In the pawn shop scenario, the use of a vehicle to commute to an illegal transaction

would constitute probable cause that it facilitated the transaction, and Jane would bear
the burden of proving that she did not drive to the shop intending to participate in a drug
transaction.
" See One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F2d at 1427; One 1983 Pontiac Gran Prix, 604 F
Supp at 896.
"' Circumstantial evidence and witness testimony can be used to help discern intent.
For example, a "unique" vehicle with special characteristics, such as hidden compartments
for smuggling, is clearly intended to facilitate illegal transactions.
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Facilitation is not readily generalized, and an intent-focused
view avoids an arbitrary definition of facilitation without reference to the circumstances of the particular case. An intent-based
interpretation is suggested by the literal language of the statute
itself. Concerns of individual justice and due process also require
that only vehicles intended for use in connection with an illegal
transaction be subject to forfeiture.
An intent-based standard properly balances the individual's
constitutional rights with Congress's intention to crack down on
the tools of the drug trade. Furthermore, this standard recognizes the quasi-criminal nature of Section 881(a)(4) by incorporating
intent, or mens rea, in the forfeiture determination. Through an
intent-focused standard, vehicles that are merely fortuitously
connected to drug transactions are spared while those intended
as tools of the illegal drug trade remain subject to forfeiture.

